Henry Kissinger once famously said: “It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but it is fatal to be America’s friend.” Those words explain US foreign policy better than any academic theory. The US doesn’t keep “friends” or “allies” in the real sense, it keeps projects. If you serve the project, you’re embraced. If you stop serving it, you’re sidelined or worse. Examples are everywhere. The US talks loudly about democracy, but some of its closest partners today are dictators. Even more striking, in Syria, a man once branded as an ISIS terrorist with a bounty on his head—someone Washington accused of fueling violence—suddenly became an “ally” because he helped undermine Bashar al-Assad. President Trump even called him a “good guy.” Yesterday’s terrorist became today’s partner, simply because he fit the project of the moment. That is the American playbook and India is learning it the hard way.
The Indo-Pacific Illusion
For nearly two decades, from George W. Bush to Biden, India-US relations looked like they were on an upward path. Civil nuclear agreements, defense ties, tech partnerships, and eventually the Quad gave the impression that Washington saw New Delhi as a strategic partner. But that “strategic partnership” was never about India. It was about using India as the only Asian power capable of containing China. This was the long-term project. The expectation in Washington was clear: India would be the frontline state against Beijing, ready to escalate, even militarily, when border tensions rose. The 2020 Galwan clash between India and China was seen in the US as the perfect spark; finally, an Asian war that would drain China’s rise.
But India refused to play the script. Instead of turning Galwan into an open war, New Delhi chose diplomacy and a slow, difficult process of disengagement along the Line of Actual Control. For the US, this was the ultimate project failure. Its long-term goal of positioning India as a permanent counterweight through conflict collapsed. Washington realized India would not sacrifice its sovereignty or strategic autonomy to become America’s proxy in an Asian war. And once that became clear, the mood in Washington shifted from “partner” to “problem.”
The Excuses: Oil and Markets
Of course, no superpower admits its projects fail. Instead, excuses are manufactured. We now hear about India refusing to open its agro-dairy market to US goods, or India buying discounted Russian oil. But these are minor irritants at best. After all, Europe also buys Russian energy in various forms, and even the US itself imports fertilizers, critical materials like uranium and palladium from Moscow. These talking points are smokescreens. The real issue is simple: India refused to go to war with China. That was the turning point.
The Pakistan Pivot
Having lost its “China project” through India, Washington quickly recalibrated. Pakistan, long treated with suspicion, was re-engaged. Through IMF and World Bank channels, nearly $40 billion flowed in to stabilize Islamabad. This wasn’t about love for Pakistan. It was about pressure. A financially stronger Pakistan provides Washington a regional lever, a bargaining chip, and most importantly a way to make life difficult for India. Once again, it’s not about friendship or enmity. It’s about utility.
India’s Hard Lesson
If there’s one takeaway for New Delhi, it’s this: the US is transactional to the core. India misread America’s embrace as genuine partnership, when in fact it was just a long-term project to weaken China. Once India refused to play proxy, the project ended and so did the warmth.
What India Should Do
- Remember Kissinger’s line. Never confuse US support with friendship. It’s always conditional.
- Stick to strategic autonomy. India was right not to be dragged into an unnecessary war.
- Diversify ties. BRICS, Europe, Japan, ASEAN, the Gulf—every link reduces American leverage.
- Be pragmatic. Cooperate with the US where interests overlap, but don’t expect loyalty.
- Draw red lines. Especially on terrorism. Any US policy that empowers groups in Pakistan must be resisted firmly.
India’s biggest “mistake” in Washington’s eyes was choosing peace with China over war. That single decision collapsed a decades-long project. From then on, India went from partner to problem. The lesson is clear: with the US, you can’t be a true friend or enemy; only useful or not. India’s best path forward is to keep relations strictly transactional: firm handshakes, clear contracts, zero illusions.